Homologizing as kinding by Kendig, Catherine
Homology is a natural kind concept,1,2 but one that has been notoriously elusive to 
pin down. There has been, and continues to be, sustained debate over the nature 
of correspondence (e.g. whether homology is an all-or-nothing relation or whether 
it admits of degrees) and the units of comparison (e.g. whole organisms, traits as 
morphological outcomes, behavioural activities, biochemical mechanisms, devel-
opmental processes, or certain properties of traits).
With some notable exceptions,3,4 the continued debate over its meaning within 
history and philosophy of biology over the last 25 years has focused on defin-
ing homology rather than on its use in practice. The aim of this chapter is to 
reverse this trend and to concentrate instead on the practices of homologizing. 
I define “homologizing” to be a concept-in-use. Practices of homologizing are 
kinds of rule following, the satisfaction of which demarcates a category – that of 
being a homologue. Identifying, explaining, discovering, and understanding are 
exchanges that connect practice to concept through the performance of a rule by 
practitioners.5 I contend that these practices of homologizing are constitutive of 
natural kinding activities6 and that it is the activity that precipitates what recently 
has been called “homology thinking”7. If homologizing is a kind of kinding, then 
consideration of the nature of the comparative practices used in its discovery, 
tracking, and identification not only clarifies its meaning, its use, and the progres-
sion of the concept of homology, but also provides further understanding of the 
processes and progression of natural kinds and kinding practices in general.
A record of comparative investigations and the identification of sameness of 
form in different animals (e.g. iterations of structure, segmentation, dorsal/ventral 
polarity) has been observed and documented since Andreas Vesalius’s8 De humani 
corporis fabrica. These illustrated volumes generated knowledge of biological 
kinds through the comparative practices used in their production.9 The extensive 
anatomical and physiological collections of John Hunter10 and Richard Owen11 
exemplified making, displaying, and tracking the sameness of form in different 
organisms. These curated collections, their identification of type specimens, and 
the meticulous descriptions of these served as the ontological corpus and epis-
temic estate required for adjudicating whether a particular organism belongs to, 
or lays outside of, a particular kind.
In the following, I suggest that homologizing can be understood as a set of 
kinding activities that have shaped, and continue to shape, the meaning and use 
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of homology. Investigation into historical as well as current comparative practices 
reveals the diversity of these natural kind-generating and natural kind-discovering 
practices, the nature of correspondence, the units of comparison, and the continu-
ing impact of these practices on the concept homology.
1 Early comparative practices from Vesalius to Darwin
Scientific understanding in the late Renaissance was shaped by the practice 
approach of the Flemish anatomist Vesalius. Cadavers and their active dissec-
tion were his pedagogical tools. His De fabrica recorded the anatomical details 
gleaned from the operating theatre. Depictions and representations of these begin 
with the elaborate frontispiece facing the book’s title page. Vesalius includes 
implicit representations of serial repetition in the form and structure of bones and 
muscles as indicated in the illustrations of the Fabrica using Greek letters. The 
same Greek letter was used to indicate the ribs or ulnae in the skeleton of the same 
organism. This referential naming of parts facilitated their description as the same 
part. Vesalius also presents other animals as comparative epistemological subjects 
to aid understanding of human anatomy. Representations of a dog and human 
skull alongside each other are shown twice within the Fabrica. And the dissection 
of a pig by putti surgeons is featured in his historiated capitals. Much of Vesalius’s 
text relies on descriptions taken from observed dissections of animals. Underly-
ing the use of illustrations and descriptions of the dissection of animals as proxies 
for those of humans seems to be an unstated assumption that there is (at least in 
use) a unity of form that makes knowledge of animal skeletal, vascular, and organ 
orientation extendable to that of humans. That pigs and dogs were dissected and 
represented in the Fabrica suggests an implicit comparative approach to the study 
of anatomical structure across organisms.
Evidence for the explicit structural equivalence between the features of different 
animals can be found 12 years after Vesalius’s work, in Pierre Belon’s anatomical 
illustrations.12 These detailed sketches compare the position and arrangement of the 
bones of a human with those of a bird. What was of particular significance in these 
sketches was how Belon arranged the bones of both the bird and the human skel-
eton in the same upright position. The skeleton of the bird was shown in an unnatu-
ral position that mirrored the upright standing position of the human skeleton: its 
head, neck, and spinal column forming a straight line and the forelimbs hanging 
down on either side of the body ventrally splayed. This intentional arrangement 
emphasized the positional equivalence and corresponding topology of the bones of 
each animal and their similar skeletal relationships.13 Vesalius’s anatomical studies 
and Belon’s comparative anatomical illustrations and descriptions were augmented 
by the detailed compendia of Gessner, Aldrovandi, Johnstone, and Faber.
But the representational and descriptive approaches used in these were trans-
formed by the experimental investigations of a group referred to as le compagnie 
in the Paris Academy of Sciences.14 Claude Perrault, Louis Gayant, Jean Pecquet, 
and Joseph-Guichard Duverney extended and reformed biological natural kind-
ing practices within their studies of comparative anatomy and physiology.15 For 
Perrault and the rest of the Paris compagnie, natural kinding was a communal 
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rather than a solitary activity. Descriptions and representations were produced 
by a company of collective actors. Led by Perrault, the compagnie worked col-
laboratively on their projects of anatomical and physiological observation.16 This 
collaboration was necessary, according to Perrault,17 to ensure scientific accuracy 
and understanding. Although dissections and observations were augmented with 
reflection and reason, the guiding rule was that empirical knowledge trumped ana-
lytical knowledge. Accordingly, each specimen was treated as novel rather than as 
a token of a particular preconceived type.18
Dissection was directed, observed, and interpreted by committee in an attempt 
to resolve a more accurate picture – and one without assumptions of Cartesian 
mechanical philosophy of nature or unification of organic form.19 This is exempli-
fied in the discussion of a small spotted African cat, the Chat-pard (see Figure 7.1). 
Debate over the kindhood of the animal, whose features bore resemblance to mul-
tiple organisms familiar to the compagnie, was retained in the published descrip-
tion.20 Despite all observing the same animal and investigative dissection, they 
concluded different causes for the apparent mixture of comparatively similar fea-
tures to local European species. Whilst some described the cat as a mélange, there 
was disagreement over the different species which might have mated resulting in 
the birth of the apparent hybrid. Others speculated over its possible sterility or 
whether it might have been a castrate due to the defective and imperfectly formed 
organs of generation and the notable accumulation of fat that was revealed upon 
dissection.21 The compagnie was unable to decide from the empirical evidence 
which of the several causal accounts were the cause of the apparent hybridity, 
morphological, and physiological similarities. The decision of the compagnie 
was that the causal explanation outstripped the empirical evidence. As a result, 
the Chat-pard was treated as a unique specimen whose categorization was unre-
solved. In the description of the animal, empirical descriptions citing similarities 
and differences of the parts of the Chat-pard with other species are retained but its 
full classification with regard to other known species remained an open question.22
Building on the work of Vesalius, Belon, Ruini, Perrault, and the compagnie, the 
most famous and arguably most influential discussions on comparative anatomy 
were the debates between Georges Cuvier and Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire at 
the Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle, Jardin des Plantes in Paris.23 Cuvier 
and Geoffroy held different views on what they believed to be the significant 
relationships among corresponding traits in different animals. The centrality of 
positional continuity formed the foundation of Geoffroy’s theory of homology, 
the keystone of which he called the principe des connexions. Cuvier’s concep-
tion of homology focused on whether interdependent structures share a common 
functional goal or purpose in different animals. Whereas Cuvier relied on kinding 
organisms into four embranchements (Articulata, Mollusca, Radiata, and Ver-
tebrata), Geoffroy’s reliance on an abstracted notion of a universal body plan 
meant that the kinds of organs in different animals depended ultimately on their 
relative topological position. Cuvier’s body plans were discrete and fixed. There 
were no transformations and no intermediates between the four embranchements. 
For Geoffroy, the universal body plan was almost infinitely flexible, producing a 
continuum of intermediate transformations and modifications to this body plan.
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Following these debates, Richard Owen applied both Cuvierian and Geof-
froyian kinding approaches and practices to his ordering and reordering, and 
in describing the contents of the Hunterian Museum of the Royal College of 
Figure 7.1  The Chat-pard. Perrault, C. (ed.) (1676) Mėmoires pour servir à l’histoire 
naturelle des animaux. Paris: Imprimerie royale. Reproduced with kind per-
mission from the Linda Hall Library of Science, Engineering, and Technology.
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Surgeons in Lincoln’s Inn Fields.24 Owen used the London museum (where he 
acted as assistant curator25) and its contents in explaining organic order and form. 
Hunter had initially organized the collection to reflect a natural classification of 
organs and parts according to their physiological functions. Hunter divided his 
preparations into different sections, each containing a series of specimens of vari-
ous anatomical parts of different animals grouped together to display either a 
general morphology or particular physiological function (e.g. those containing 
organs of motion, digestion, circulation, respiration, or reproduction). Specimens 
were arranged within each section from most rudimentary to most complex to 
display the comparative features of organs in different stages and from different 
organisms.26
From 1826 to 1830 Owen catalogued 13,000 specimens within the collec-
tion. Of these, there was one he was particularly intrigued by: a preserved pearly 
nautilus without its shell (see Figure 7.2). Representations and descriptions of 
comparative kinds pepper Owen’s Memoir on the Pearly Nautilus.27 He uses the 
words “analogy” and “analogous” on nearly every other page. Unlike in his later 
work, “analogy” and “precisely analogous” are used consistently to mean con-
tinuity of structure.28 Owen also speaks of the “affinity” and “parallelism” and 
“non-analogy”.29 His investigations on the nautilus led him to conclude, pace 
Geoffroy, that there was not a “simple and unbroken series, plan of composition, 
or a principle of unity”.30 Here Owen follows Cuvier. But later, he relies on a more 
Geoffroyian notion, stating that
[i]t will be seen how considerable are the external differences between the 
Pearly Nautilus and the higher Cephalopods; nevertheless, its general plan 
of organization renders its claim to rank with them indisputable; and as its 
locomotive apparatus is confined to the head, the received denomination of 
the class remains undisturbed by its admission.31
Following his Memoir on the Pearly Nautilus, Owen published formal defini-
tions of the two kinds of comparative concepts in use in order to distinguish them 
from one another and avoid confusion between them. He identifies the cause of 
the sameness of analogous organismal traits in terms of the common functions 
they serve: “Analogue: . . . A part or organ in one animal which has the same 
function as another part or organ in a different animal”.32 Owen’s definition of 
homology contains no such causal explanation: “Homologue: . . . The same organ 
in different animals under every variety of form and function”.33 Owen’s defini-
tion of homologues as “the same organs” is intended to capture their topological 
orientation and structural correspondence in different organisms. Homologous 
organs, such as the wing of a magpie and the foreleg of a hedgehog, were identi-
fied in terms of their corresponding topological location within the magpie and 
the hedgehog in relation to their other features (e.g. the position of the humerus 
and its attachment by ligaments to the ulnae and radii of each animal). In contrast, 
the biological concept of analogy was defined in terms of the functional sameness 
of two organs in different organisms. For instance, the wings of a blow fly are 
Figure 7.2  Pearly Nautilus. Owen, R. (1832) Memoir on the Pearly Nautilus. London: 
Richard Taylor, plate 1. Reproduced with kind permission from the Linda Hall 
Library of Science, Engineering, and Technology.
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analogous to the wings of a hummingbird. These are identified as such because of 
their similar functional role in enabling the animal to manoeuvre itself around an 
aerial environment.
Owen’s formal definitions of these comparative kind concepts can be seen in 
some sense as codification of the earlier kinding practices of comparative anato-
mists and physiologists as they drew from the kinding approaches, methods, and 
activities of Cuvier’s theory of embranchements, Geoffroy’s principe des con-
nexions, Hunter’s curating and ordering practices, and the anatomical illustra-
tions and descriptions of Vesalius, Belon, Ruini, and Perrault. However, Owen 
did not believe that Cuvier’s teleological point of view sufficiently explained the 
same topological correspondence of organs’ positions across a variety of different 
animals:
After the publication of the ‘Memoir on the Pearly Nautilus’, . . . the question 
of the condition or law of special homologies pressed itself upon me, more 
especially in connection with the task of arranging and cataloguing the osteo-
logical part of the Hunterian Museum. As my observations and comparisons 
accumulated, with pari passu tests of observed phenomena of osteogeny, 
they enforced a reconsideration of Cuvier’s conclusions to which I had previ-
ously yielded assent.34
To rectify what he found (in the course of his kinding and homologizing activities) 
to be an omission, he augmented Cuvier’s account with Geoffroy’s notion of the 
universal body plan – what Owen called the “archetype”. For Owen, “archetype” 
referred to a common plan or structural arrangement. Studying and cataloguing 
the bones of the Hunterian was catalyst for his re-examination and the later postu-
lation of not just the archetype as an ideal plan of structure for all vertebrates, but 
for three different kinds of homologizing: general, special, and serial homology. 
General homology was the comparison of two or more organs as the same where 
their sameness to each other was caused by their relationship to the same organ 
in the archetype.35 Special homology was defined as the comparison of the same 
organs within two different organisms. This relationship does not include the com-
parison to the same organ in the archetype, but consists in “the correspondence of 
a part or organ [as] determined by its relative position and connections, with a part 
or organ in different animals”.36 The third kind of homology Owen specified was 
serial homology, which was the sameness between different parts or organs within 
the same organism (these parts are thought to possess the same basic structure). 
Serial homologues arose from the repetitive construction and development of an 
iterative part (e.g. the vertebrae or the leaves of a plant).
Although intended to identify the identity of two organs, the notion of same-
ness Owen employed was not meant to imply the material identity of two organs. 
After Owen formalized the definitions of homology and analogy, attempts to pro-
vide a causal explanation of the sameness of homologues became a widespread 
endeavour. Comparative embryological studies of the morphological features of 
many organisms’ early anatomy lead both Ernst Haeckel37 and Charles Darwin38 
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to reconceive Owen’s concept of homology in terms of the historical continuity 
of traits over generations of ancestors and descendants. But whereas Haeckel’s 
historical notion of homology was based on the theory of recapitulation, Darwin’s 
was based on the theory of descent with modification.
Darwin was, however, keen to distance himself from the idealism of Owen and 
Geoffroy and their particular use of the archetype. Avoiding this idealist notion 
meant that in order to integrate Owen’s concept of homology into his theory of 
evolution, Darwin needed to make some alterations to its meaning and reference.
Owen’s special homology made no reference to the archetype. But it also pro-
vided no causal explanation of the topological correspondence of organs in differ-
ent animals. It was merely a description of their same correspondence. The only 
kind of homology characterized by Owen that had a causal explanation within 
its definition was that of general homology – the sameness of two corresponding 
organs in different animals to each other was caused by their same relationship to 
the same organ in the archetype.
Although Darwin sought to avoid these commitments to idealism, he does not 
rely on Owen’s notion of special homology (which does not refer to the arche-
type) for the basis of his own account of homology. It was instead Owen’s general 
homology that Darwin used. Looking at the role homology plays in Darwin’s 
theory reveals why. For Darwin, homology is not just a description but a causal 
explanation; organs correspond to each other because they both correspond to the 
same common cause – a shared ancestor. Darwin’s concept makes use of the same 
form of explanation as Owen’s general homology but interprets the archetype dif-
ferently – in terms of the historic notion of a shared common ancestor rather than 
the idealist notion of the archetype:
[S]uppose that the ancient progenitor, the archetype as it may be called, of 
all mammals, had its limbs constructed on the existing general pattern, for 
whatever purpose they served, we can at once perceive the plain signification 
of the homologous construction of the limbs throughout the whole class.39
The historical notion of Darwin’s “ancient progenitor” replaces Owen’s idealist 
“archetype”. According to Darwin’s historical notion of homology, the traits of 
two different organisms are not homologous because of their shared function or 
form – which may differ greatly – and not because of their position or orientation. 
These traits are homologous because they have both been inherited (and modified) 
from the same trait in an ancestor common to them both.
2 Homologizing as monophyleticizing
Darwin’s historical notion has been revised and reconceived in terms of an 
historical-analytic conception of homology since its inception, and later in terms 
of a particular kind of phylogenetic relationship.40 These later conceptions include 
restrictions on both the meaning of homology and its application. In one of the 
most restrictive forms, it limits the meaning of homology as referring only to 
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traits that are inherited through a monophyletic lineage – the result of a continu-
ous unbroken linear inheritance from one shared ancestor possessing the ancestral 
trait to all (and only) its descendants: “[H]omology . . . is defined not in terms of 
similarity, correspondence, or ancestry but in terms of monophyly”.41
One of the most widely used approaches in comparative biology and classifica-
tion relying on the monophyletic understanding of homology is cladism.42 Clad-
ism conceives of evolution as a series of speciation events over evolutionary time, 
represented as the branchings of a bifurcating tree. According to cladists a natu-
ral group is a branch of this phylogenetic tree called a clade. A clade is a group 
of individuals related by a continuous common phylogenetic lineage. Cladists, as 
well as other phylogenetic approaches to homology which conceive of homologiz-
ing as monophyleticizing, tend to take what I dub an “all-or-nothing” approach to 
homology – either the trait is inherited through a monophyletic lineage, and so is 
a homologue, or it is not. All traits that are not the result of monophyletic lineages 
are grouped together and referred to collectively as “false homologies” or “homo-
plasies”, a sort of ersatz kind or comparative class made up of things excluded from 
the class of kinds which is of interest, that is, homologies. “Homoplasy [is defined] 
as the possession by two or more taxa of a character derived not from the nearest 
common ancestor but through convergence, parallelism, or reversal”.43
Homoplasy can refer to the analogical similarity or sameness of corresponding 
traits due to inheritance from multiple ancestors through parallel or convergent 
evolution. But it also refers to structural correspondences of traits between organ-
isms that have inherited the trait from more than one ancestor (i.e. are polyphyl-
etic), as well as traits inherited through a broken lineage from a shared ancestor 
(e.g. recurrent traits that do not occur in every generation).
Understanding the study of homology as monophyleticizing commits propo-
nents to a linear view of causation. A linear view of biological causation is a con-
tinuous causal chain that links genes to developmental schedules to phenotypes.
The traditional idea of homology visualizes a linear series of changes whereby 
an ancestral trait has been transformed into a descendent one. . . . By this idea 
different homologues may appear differently modified on different phyloge-
netic branches, but each descendent homologous trait has at its core a single 
ancestral trait.44
Traits are the outcomes of the linear inheritance of instructional programs for 
building phenotypic traits. Homologues are the phenotypic outcomes of the same 
genes that code for these traits which are vertically inherited from one generation 
to the next in an unbroken ancestor-descendent lineage. Using kind as a verb, this 
sets up a clear dichotomy between concepts and activities that kind unbroken 
(monophyletic) lineages and those that kind broken lineages. Restricting homol-
ogy to an all-or-nothing relationship means that different organisms either share a 
common ancestor and are therefore homologues, or they do not and are not homo-
logues. Homology does not come in degrees, and partial homology is disallowed.
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Opposition to the inclusion of partial homology as a kind of homology (rather 
than as a kind of homoplasy) has been sustained with few challengers.45 Partial 
homology has been vociferously objected to as a threat to the Modern Synthesis: 
“Partial homology is incompatible with standard evolutionary views, according 
to which structures are either homologous or not”.46 The anti-partial homology 
consensus is broad. It includes not just neo-Darwinians but some proponents of 
developmental systems perspectives.47 Even if partial homology is accepted with 
regard to the comparison of genes, it is widely believed that “[p]artial homology 
does not occur with morphological characters”.48 In the remaining sections I pre-
sent empirical evidence that calls into question both the opposition to the inclu-
sion of partial homology as a kind of homologizing and the claim that doing so 
would amount to a contravention of evolutionary theory.
3 Multi-modular traits and mosaic origins
Some complex traits may be the result of multiple (and discontinuous) lineages 
of inheritance or what could be called mosaic origins. What I mean by mosaic 
origins is that different sub-features of the same trait can evolve independently 
of others. They may change in diverse ways to the other sub-features, evolve at 
different rates, or utilize different resources in their construction. These discrete 
features may be weakly linked to other features of a particular part of an organism. 
Because they are weakly linked, one feature of the trait may dissociate from it and 
may then be used in association with a different trait. This re-configurability of 
modular features (as subunits of traits) constitutes a highly conserved core capac-
ity of organisms.49
The possibility of dissociating these modular units and their subsequent rear-
rangement into novel combinations by the organism to serve other purposes 
further increases the organism’s ability to vary its growth to meet new needs. 
Variation can then be understood to be the organization and reorganization of 
modular parts. Mosaic traits are organized into complex systems in their devel-
opment, effectively “choreographed” by the organism “through [different] causal 
factors giving rise to morphological associations”.50 Different features of the 
same trait capable of independent variation may have different developmental 
pathways and may be responsive to different genetic and extra-genetic resources 
but remain coordinated by the organism. For instance, cranial and jaw bone 
development in rats varies at different rates of growth. In the early development 
of the rat pup these exist as separate and independent structures. However, in the 
adult rat they form a mosaic complex trait. These two previously separate bones 
are now used by the organism in a coordinated way so that the length of the jaw 
correlates with the growth of the skull. Linking the two structures provides the 
organism the means to accommodate the new feeding behaviour it learns after 
weaning. Instead of requiring morphological structures that allow it to suckle 
milk from its mother, the coordinated growth of its jaw and skull enables it to 
masticate solid food.51
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Another example of the mosaic construction of organismal traits from diverse 
sources is the construction of plant leaves from different histogenic layers of the 
meristem:
[Each histogenic] layer of the meristem makes a [different] contribution to 
the formation of leaves. In dicots, the L1 layer contributes only to the epi-
dermis, whereas the L2 and L3 layers contribute to the internal tissues of the 
leaf. The contributions of individual layers are not strictly lineage dependent, 
however. A cell from one layer occasionally invades a neighbouring layer, 
where it contributes to lateral organs in a manner characteristic of the new 
layer rather than the original layer, demonstrating its lack of commitment.52
The initiation and determination of the organism’s leaves are the product of 
diverse cellular, genetic, and environmental resources and the organization and 
reorganization of the organism’s patterns of development. These include its hor-
monal changes, rates of cell division, changes in the plant’s polarity, position in 
relation to other leaves, and environmental influences (e.g. sun exposure, sub-
mersion underwater). Understanding traits as mosaics requires treating them as 
the product of the heterogeneous construction of self-organizing and reorganizing 
organisms. Accordingly, traits are the product of contingent processes, the novel 
recombination of sub-features or units, and the organism-directed choreography 
of distributed genetic, behavioural, and environmental resources.
4 From linear to multidimensional thinking
Homology, as typically defined, is sameness that is due to common descent from 
a shared ancestor. Since Darwin, it is not this definition which was the subject of 
the debates but the meaning and use of the concept of homology, the criteria used 
for identifying instances of homology, and how homology is to be distinguished 
from analogy. Many of these debates seem to centre on whether the common 
descent from a shared ancestor is broken or unbroken.53 Broken ancestry refers to 
the absence of the sameness in some generations, for example, recurrent traits54 or 
latent phenotypes.55 Unbroken ancestry requires the sameness to appear in every 
generation.56 Standard monophyletic and all-or-nothing accounts of homology 
only regard inheritance from unbroken lineages as candidates for homologizing.
Recent research into developmental recombination, facilitated variation, phe-
notypic plasticity, niche construction, and cultural inheritance has forced hard 
questioning of the widespread assumption that evolution is, for the most part, 
unbroken and consistently linear.57 These also pose new challenges to the standard 
account of homology when viewed through the lens of comparative practices:
The possible role of phenotypic plasticity in the evolution of phenotypic nov-
elties may offer an excellent system in which to apply both the experimental 
and the comparative methods to tackle the intimately related problems of 
homology and the origin of new traits.58
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I contend that practices of kinding in comparative biology are reshaping the 
conception(s) of homology. A turn to a multidimensional approach to evolution 
has meant concepts defined within the linear approach require not just a pragmatic 
rejigging of methodological practices but a retuning59 of homological concep-
tualization too. If alternative routes of inheritance (e.g. horizontal, vertical, and 
diagonal) and the inheritance of extra-genetic (e.g. behavioural, ecological, epi-
genetic, and microbiotic) resources are taken seriously, then morphological traits 
can be conserved and their continuity maintained across successive generations in 
spite of basic changes to developmental and genetic resources.60 The same gross 
morphological traits may be present in two different organisms, but each may be 
the result of different developmental pathways and genetic resources. An organ-
ism may recombine some of its phenotypic features in a novel way or make use 
of new genetic or extra-genetic resources and variations within its environment. 
This means that novel phenotypes may be the result of the rearrangement and 
reorganization of old phenotypes and old resources linked together in new ways. 
Mary Jane West-Eberhard calls this combinatorial evolution:
Combinatorial evolution raises the possibility that derived traits may often 
contain elements of more than one ancestral trait, and that what was formerly 
seen as a de novo modification actually involves the recombined expression 
of preexisting traits.61
Rather than following a single continuous unbroken linear route, evolution 
progresses intermodally62 – involving different modes or routes of inheritance 
in conveying heritable resources. Recognition of the plasticity of developmen-
tal processes and phenotypes alters our natural biological kinding concepts by 
changing how we homologize. How we evaluate causes of evolutionary variation 
in the judgement of homology affects how we track historical continuity, what 
is included in the mechanisms of inheritance, which relationships between traits 
of organisms are attended to in comparison of potential homologues, and what 
lineage-based conception of species result from our homologizing.63
The standard, linear homology thinking kinds the traits of organisms in each gen-
eration in virtue of their unbroken lineage of inheritance. In contrast, what I’ll dub 
“multidimensional homology thinking” takes the traits of organisms to not always 
be the result of unbroken lineages; they can also be the result of discontinuous and 
reticulate lineages of inheritance. Multidimensional homology thinking about the 
heterogeneous causes of traits takes traits to be the result of different developmental 
processes and reorganizing activities of both vertically and horizontally inherited 
genetic, epigenetic, developmental, behavioural, and ecological resources. That is, 
it takes the causes of homologous traits to be located not just in the continuity of 
genetic ancestral lineages, but in the continuity of epigenetic, environmental, and 
cultural lineages too (recognizing these do not necessarily coincide). Viewed in this 
way, the conservation of traits over generations might be due to the developmen-
tal pathways, the cellular connections, the use of other phenotypic capacities or 
resources, or certain generative systems of pattern formation which are conserved.
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5 Retuning homology in response to homologizing practices
I began this chapter laying out some of the longstanding debates within com-
parative and evolutionary biology, the meaning and use of homology, and the 
origins of this kind of kinding. The concepts used within comparative biology 
and the activities of natural kinding have a history of being revised and retuned in 
response to comparative research practices. The remaining sections of this chapter 
aim to show that this is an ongoing process by providing evidence of the current 
retuning of homology to incorporate partial and mixed homologizing.
If we want to compare mosaic traits, our standard monophyletic view of 
homology seems ill-equipped. Homologizing depends on tracking descent from 
a common ancestor – a shared common cause. But if the traits in two different 
organisms we are seeking to compare are mosaic – each the result of fragmented 
discontinuous lineages or the result of multiple origins – how is this possible? 
Taking seriously multidimensional evolutionary lineages seems to call into ques-
tion the assumption that homology is always an all-or-nothing kind of natural 
kind. But how can we reconceive the homology of traits if traits are the result 
of intermodal constructive processes of biological organization, developmental 
reorganization, and evolution? Can there be a homological relationship between 
two or more mosaic traits?
I contend that comparing the morphological traits or developmental pathways 
of two different organisms may reveal not one but multiple causal sources of 
continuity. The conservation of homologous traits, especially complex traits, may 
be the result of multiple distributed resources. Novel traits may be the result of 
reshuffling and new linkages between the already-present features of traits or the 
result of novel timing. These features may be used by each organism being com-
pared in correspondingly different ways. The use of these resources in particu-
lar ways by both organisms ensures the continuity of the particular phenotypic 
traits being compared as homologues. If the resources or developmental pathways 
being compared are due to some shared common resources or pathways, then 
they are homologues. Understanding homologizing in this way just means that 
although homologizing by monophyleticizing does pick out all-or-nothing natural 
kinds, they are not the only kind of natural kind that homologizing can identify. 
A mixed (intermodal) approach to homologizing tracks the multiple ancestral ori-
gins of the different parts that make up a single derived trait.64
Recognizing the role of modular re-configurability in development and multi-
dimensional evolution ultimately affects how we circumscribe the units of com-
parison and provides empirical evidence to challenge the conceptual opposition 
to partial homology – in particular, the suspicion that it contravenes our under-
standing of evolution. If our understanding of evolution has shifted from a linear 
to a multidimensional view, then this demands a shift in our homology thinking 
that relies on this same evidence. The upshot? Partial homology – far from being 
incompatible with evolutionary theory – may provide an invaluable addition to 
our suite of natural biological kind concepts.
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6 Homologizing, holobionts, and typification
I initially described homologizing as a kind of natural kinding activity. But as 
the abbreviated history of comparative anatomy and physiology from Vesalius 
through Perrault’s compagnie, Owen, Darwin, and revisions to the evolutionary 
synthesis have shown, homologizing as a set of activities exists within nested 
practices, empirical investigations, and protocols for the interpretation of these. 
These practices and protocols constrain the overarching meta-conceptual system 
that specifies how the category of homologues fits with the categories specified by 
other concepts (e.g. species, lineage, traits).
Multidimensional kind thinking extends what has been referred to as the holo-
biont/hologenome theory65 of evolution – a theory developed from investigative 
observations of symbiotic relationships. In particular, the heritability of micro-
bial and genomic resources from the symbiotic relationships of corals and their 
microbial communities. From these investigative practices, it was the holobi-
ont – not the species, organism, population – that was reconsidered to be the unit 
of selection.66 Multidimensional kind thinking expands the hologenome theory 
augmenting genomic and hologenomic inheritance with other kinds of inheritance 
(e.g. epigenetic, behavioural, and cultural). Multidimensional kind thinking is a 
reconceptualization of natural kindhood, but it is both based on practice and may 
affect the tracking of future homological practices.
For instance, if mosaic and partial homologizing is possible, what does this 
mean for the typification of type species that relies on the identification of the 
presence or absence of homologous traits in identifying a specimen as rep-
resentative of a new species and designating it as a holotype of that species 
by practitioners?67 The holotype designation allows researchers to identify a 
specimen in question as being of the same new species as the holotype spe-
cies by anatomical and physiological comparative methods of the specimen 
in question in relation to the holotype as the specimen designated as the name 
bearing representative of the new species.68 If homology tracks the same traits 
due to shared ancestry/phylogeny, then it tracks routes of inheritance. If what 
counts as a potential route of inheritance shifts (as the holobiont theory of 
evolution and the multidimensional approach to inheritance suggest), then this 
may affect the typification of specimens. This would occur if typification of 
holotypes tracked the inheritance of multiple organisms – as in the case of 
holobionts.
This is not as far-fetched as it may sound. The designation of holotypes in the 
most recent edition of the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature extends 
eligibility of name-bearing types from those eligible in earlier editions. “Holo-
type” may refer not just to a single organism but also to “a colony of animals that 
exists in nature as a single entity, derived by asexual or vegetative multiplication 
from a single individual (e.g. a colony of cnidarians, such as corals), or part of 
such a colony”.69
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7 Partial homology, revisited
In the foregoing, I have suggested that what has been traditionally thought to 
be independently evolved structures may actually be the result of a combination 
of various ancestral traits synthesized together to form an amalgam trait in the 
descendant. In contrast to the standard all-or-nothing kind of homology thinking, 
I have offered multidimensional homology thinking. Multidimensional homol-
ogy thinking would mean that when we compare these amalgam traits, we would 
attend to their various origins of their composite evolved structures tracking the 
diverse routes of inheritance. How might an application of this kind of homology 
thinking look in practice? I provide one example here.70
Both humans and octopi have camera eyes. Their eyes possess certain striking 
sameness or similarities of general structure and function. The camera eyes of 
octopi and humans both have lenses and retinae with photoreceptors. However, 
the photoreceptors of humans face the back of the eye, while those of octopi face 
the front.71 Some of the ontogenetic origins of octopi and human eyes also differ. 
Whereas octopus photoreceptor cells differentiate from the epidermis, those of 
humans differentiate from the nervous system.72 Because of these and other differ-
ences, octopi and human eyes are widely believed to have evolved independently 
rather than being inherited from a common ancestor.73 They are thought to be 
analogues not homologues.
Conceiving of octopi and human eyes as analogues and not homologues offers 
a limited description of these similarities. There is much evidence suggesting the 
homology of the structural organization of visual systems in octopi and humans.74 
Vision in humans and octopi is the result of light on organs which are photosensi-
tive. The retinae of both organisms use rhodopsin for photoreception. Rhodopsin 
is a type of opsin. Over 1,000 different opsin proteins have been found in different 
animals.75 What is striking is that in each and every animal, the opsin is connected 
to the same 11-cis-retinal chromophore.76 The 1,000+ opsins are grouped into five 
types or families, all of which are thought to share a distant common ancestor 
possessing multiple opsin types.77 Apart from the deep homology of the opsins 
across a wide range of organisms, similarities in the neurological structure of 
the visual system of octopi and humans have also been found. Exposure to light 
produces a chemical change in both octopus and human retinae. This change pro-
duces voltages that are transmitted to the brain through a network of neurological 
events.78 In addition to the structural similarities in the visual systems of octopi 
and humans, eye development in both (as well as a range of other organisms 
including fruit flies) is initiated by the Pax-6 gene.79
These findings reveal that distinguishing the eyes of octopi and humans as 
either homologous or analogous means ignoring certain aspects of their develop-
ment or structure. If we used the multidimensional homology view, we would 
conceive octopi and humans as utilizing the same resources in the construction 
of eyes in different arrangements. Their eyes can be understood as homologous 
because the resources used in their construction are present in all bilateral organ-
isms, all of which share a common ancestor. Although octopi and human eyes 
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initially appear to be analogous, it is perhaps more accurate to understand them as 
partially homologous due to their use of similar tissues, genes, cells, proteins, and 
organization of their visual systems, and partially analogous due to the different 
ontogenetic pathways which lead to the construction of similar outcomes. This 
parsing of comparative elements and the assessment of partial homology/partial 
analogy is not possible using an all-or-nothing account of homology.
The purpose of this chapter was to make a novel suggestion about the retun-
ing of the natural kind concept homology in response to activities and practices 
of homologizing. In doing so, it provided an alternative to the standard all-or-
nothing homology thinking – that traits are either completely homologous or not 
homologous at all. Instead, multidimensional homology thinking and homolo-
gizing furnish a method of tracking the conservation of morphological traits, 
mechanisms, and developmental pathways inherited by intermodal processes. 
Controversially, this retuning may mean that the sharp distinction Owen formu-
lated between homology and analogy, and the cladists’ homology and homoplasy, 
may not be possible (or desirable). Comparing two or more organismal traits as 
partially homologous and partial analogous may afford a more accurate descrip-
tion of their combinatorial origins and the intermodal routes of inheritance by 
which they have been evolutionarily conserved over generations.
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